欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
针对食品安全相关政策的实施有效性会使公众减少他们为避免食品安全危害的支出，进而减弱政策实施有效性的抵消效应的存在，分别建立了以政府及其相关部门和以社会全体作为监管主体的两个模型，并对两个模型中抵消效应进行分析和比较。结果表明：当食品安全问题导致的损失总和相对较小或者相对较大并严重到一定程度时，由社会全体作为食品安全的监管主体是更有效的；当食品安全问题导致的损失总和相对较大或者相对较大但没有严重到一定程度时，由政府及其相关部门作为监管主体是更有效的。最后结合具体算例对模型结论进行了验证，对结论在我国食品安全监管中的实际意义进行了说明。
英文摘要：
This paper builds and analyses the offsetting effect model with the government and its relative departments as the subjects of the regulation and the offsetting effect model with all members of societyas the subjects of the regulation compara- tively, it is the effectiveness of the regulation would make the public decrease their payoff for the harm form food safety ex- ists. Result shows that the regulation subject is all members of society better when the total loss is relatively small or relative- ly large and serious from food safety, and the regulation subject is the government and its departments better when the total loss is relatively large or relatively large but not to a certain degree from food safety. Finally, it tests the conclusions of the models by the specific example and explains the significance of the conclusions for the regulation of food safety in China.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Why is Chinese GDP Statistics Data Distorting? An Explanation of Game Equilibrium Evolutionary Model
Constructivism scenario evolutionary analysis of zero emission regional planning: A case of Qaidam C
Dynamics of a delayed discrete semi-ratio-dependent predator-prey system with Holling type IV functi
期刊信息
位置：