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中文摘要：
提出了两种实现国际反恐合作的途径：第一种是各国均具有二阶理性的决策能力并可以相互沟通,在囚徒困境的元博弈模型基础上,分别设计一阶和二阶互惠策略摆脱囚徒困境;第二种是直接达成国际反恐合作协议,通过情报共享和相互支援等降低各国遭受恐怖袭击的损失,达成双方合作的双赢局面。通过构建静态博弈模型作为元博弈,并分别改变其策略设计和收益,最终使得（合作,合作）成为国际反恐合作的唯一纯策略纳什均衡。
英文摘要：
Intemational anti-terrorism cooperation is easy to fall into prisoner＇s dilemma because of the double standard and the free rider behavior. The paper advises two approaches to achieve international anti-terrorism cooperation. First, two countries have the second-order rational ability and can communicate with each other, and then designs the first-order and second-order reciprocal strategies to avoid prisoner＇s dilemma. Second, two countries directly come to an agreement of international anti-terrorism cooperation, where the economic loss caused by the worldwide terrorist attacks should be reduced through sharing information and supporting each other. Taken the static game of international anti-terrorism cooperation as a meta-game model, we reached the sole Nash equilibrium {cooperation, cooperation} by changing the strategy design and payoff.
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