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中文摘要：
基于上游发电商对剩余需求的古诺博弈和下游零售电价电量刚性模型，研究电力行业纵向分拆后发电商和售电商不能控制中游传输电网情况下的跨网络一体化．结果表明，跨网络一体化降低了发电商在上游的市场势力，市场剩余需求较大或发电商数目较少时，单个发电商一体化将提高产量和利润但降低批发市场电价，独立发电商利润下降而独立售电商利润上升；如果剩余需求不太大，所有发电商采取跨网络一体化虽然会降低批发电价，但利润反而上升．与契约关系相比上下游跨网络一体化是弱占优策略，因而成为电力市场的主要发展模式．
英文摘要：
This paper examined, based on a multi-firm Cournot model for residual demand in the upstream and retail rigidity in the downstream, the reintegration between the generators and power retailers when they can not control the distribution network after the vertical disintegration in power industry. The result shows that the integration restrains the market power of generators. One integrated generator will increase its production and profit and decrease the wholesale price while the profit of an independent power producer will decrease but that of the independent power retailers will increase, if the residual demand is high enough or the number of generators is few enough. When the residual demand is not too high, the integration employed by all generators will cause the wholesale price to decrease and profits to increase. Since the integration is a weakly dominant strategy in comparison with the contractual relationship, it becomes the main development mode in the power market.
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ADJUSTING FOR PERCEPTION BIAS IN CITIZENS' SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS: A Production Function Perspective
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