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中文摘要：
协同创新是“大科学”世纪科技发展的时代主题，强化科技资源共享成为实现区域协同创新发展的内在规律使然。从协同创新博弈观的思维逻辑出发，基于同质创新政府与异质创新政府博弈模型剖析京津冀协同创新过程中科技资源共享的“囚徒困境”成因，由此建立京津冀科技资源共享的“声誉博弈”模型以寻求纳什均衡的突破点，最后从协同共享理念、协同共享机制以及协同共享环境营造多个维度提出促进京津冀科技资源共享的对策建议。
英文摘要：
Collaborative innovation is the theme of this ＂big science＂ century. To strengthen scientific and technological innovation and the resource sharing has become the inherent law to achieve collaborative innovation. Based on the outlook of collaborative innovation game theory, we present a homogeneous and heterogeneous government cooperative game model to analyze its innovation process and technology resource sharing issues that formed the ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂. Based on this, a resource sharing ＂reputation game model＂ is proposed to seek the breakthrough point of Nash equilibriunr Finally, we propose several suggestions from the aspects of collaborative sharing ideas, collaborative sharing mechanisms and collaborative sharing environment on promoting the resource sharing of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei.
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