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中文摘要：
运用激励理论中机制设计的思想建立了采购机制设计模型，即在保证供应商参与投标和真实显示自己的生产能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利。通过求解此模型得到了最优的采购机制。鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性，进一步探讨了此机制在实际运作中的实现形式。
英文摘要：
This paper studies the mechanism design of procurement auction to improve the efficiency of government procurement and realize the efficient allocation of social resources. The model of designing procurement mechanism is first built by applying the idea of mechanism design in incemive theory, which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the condition of ensuring suppliers to participate in auction and to reveal truthfully their production capability. Then, by solving this model the optimal procurement mechanism is gained. Finally, due to the complexity of the optimal mechanism, we give the implement form of this mechanism in actual auction process.
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