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中文摘要：
假定在电价拍卖过程中努力竞标是需要付出成本的，在竞标中引入竞标酬金，利用博弈论建立了一种基于竞标酬金和Nash均衡的电力市场竞价策略模型．采用Nash均衡分析法研究了该竞价策略模型的均衡解，以及竞标酬金与Nash均衡解之间的内在关系．得出的一般性结果表明在两寡头电力市场中竞标酬金不能有效地激励竞标人的努力竞价．
英文摘要：
Supposing that the bidders with effort will incur extra cost. Bid compensation is introduced and a general competitive bidding-strategies model in power market based on bid compensation and Nash equilibrium is set up by game theory. And the equilibrium solutions of the model are analyzed using Nash equilibrium method. In addition, the relationship between bid compensation and Nash equilibrium is studied. The results show that in the two-generator power market, bid compensation can not be an incentive to inducing bidders＇ effort.
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