欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
基于心理学中的有限关注理论和前景理论,研究了管理层对正负盈余预告的时机披露策略,以及投资者对盈余预告性质和管理层披露策略的反应。研究发现,投资者对正负盈余预告信息的反应具有非对称性,投资者对负面预告反应要大于对正面预告的反应。相对于正面盈余预告,管理层对负面盈余预告更倾向于选择时机披露策略。管理层的时机披露策略会降低投资者对负面预告的反应程度,从而也降低了投资者对正负盈余预告反应的非对称性。
英文摘要：
This paper investigates the timing disclosure strategies selected by the managements about earning pre-announcement and the reaction of investors to these strategies and news valence of the earning pre-announcement, employing limited attention theory and prospect theory to interpret investors＇ reactions. The results show that investors have asymmetry reactions between negative and positive earning pre-announcement, and investors react much bigger to negative earning pre-announcement than that of positive one.Meanwhile, managements are more likely to take timing disclose strategies to negative earning pre-announcement than that of positive one, and this timing disclosure strategy attenuates the investors＇ reactions to negative earning pre-announcement, which also reduces the investors＇ asymmetry reactions to negative and positive earning pre-announcement.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
位置：