针对实践中常用的三种定价方式(市场定价、固定定价、保护定价),构建了由单一风险中性的公司与多个风险规避的农户组成的“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链模型,研究了不同定价方式下公司和农户的最优决策行为.研究发现:风险规避的农户往往会选择保守的决策行为,这将影响公司的最优决策,从而使得最优决策下农户和公司的收益都会随着农户的风险规避度的减小而减小.此外,不同的定价方式也会影响农户的生产成本系数与农户和公司的最优决策之间的关系,因此政府在针对参与订单生产的农户进行补贴时,需要特别注意定价方式和补贴方式.数值分析结果表明:不同定价方式下,农产品的产出水平以及现货价格与随机产出率之间的相关性对最优决策下农户、公司的收益有显著影响;而且直观认为“合理”的保护定价却不能真的“保护”农户改善其收益,在该定价方式下农户的收益小于市场定价或是固定定价方式下农户的收益.
Based on three most common kind of pricing patterns in practice (market-set, fixed and protected pricing), this study proposes a "company + farmer" contract-farming supply chain model between a single risk-neutral company and multiple risk-averse farmers, and the company and farmers' optimal decision making behavior under different pricing patterns are analyzed. The study found that that the risk-averse farmers prefer the conservative decision-making behavior. This choice will influence the optimal decision-making behavior of the company, and thereby both the farmers and the company's revenues will decrease due to the decrease of the degree of the farmers' risk-aversion. Besides, different patterns of pricing also affect the relationship between the farmer's production cost and the optimal decision-making behaviors between the company and the farmers. Therefore, to subsidize the farmers who are participating in contract farming, the government should pay special attention to the pricing patterns and the subsidy methods. The results of the numerical analysis show that under different patterns of pricing, the correlation among output of agricultural products, spot price and random output rate has significant effects on both the company and the farmers' revenues under the optimal decision-making behavior. With protected pricing, the farmers' revenue is lower than with market-set pricing or fixed pricing. It means that this kind of "protected pricing" cannot actually protect and improve the revenue of the farmers.