中文摘要：

为实现物流服务供应链（Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC）整体利润的最大化,研究一个由物流服务集成商、物流服务提供商和功能型物流服务分包商组成的三级LSSC的协调问题.在考虑物流服务水平影响市场需求的情况下,建立以物流服务集成商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,提出一个由期权契约和成本共担收益共享契约组成的联合契约协调机制,即在LSSC的两个交易过程中,物流服务集成商与提供商之间采用期权契约协调,物流服务提供商与分包商之间执行成本共担收益共享契约.通过契约参数的合理选择实现LSSC最大收益和各成员共赢.通过均匀分布随机环境下的算例分析,验证契约机制的可行性和有效性.

英文摘要：

To maximize whole profit of Logistics Service Supply Chain （ LSSC ）, the coordination of a three-stage LSSC that consists of a logistics service integrator, a logistics service provider and a functional logistics services sub-contractor is studied. Considering the logistics service level dependent of market de- mand, a Stackelberg game model with the logistics service integrator as a leader is developed, and a joint contract coordination mechanism that includes the option contract and the cost-sharing and revenue-sha- ring contract is proposed, i.e. , the coordination between the logistics service provider and the sub-con- tractor is carried out by the option contract, and the coordination between the logistics service integrator and the provider is carried out by the cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract in the two transactions of LSSC. The maximum profit of LSSC and the win for all members can be realized by selecting reasonable parameters. An example in a uniformly distributed random environment is analyzed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model.