中文摘要：

知觉经验能够成为信念的理由,这一日常生活的图景自戴维森的挑战后便成了知识论中的热点话题。麦克道威尔试图证明,一种具有概念性内容的经验概念可以有效地应对戴维森的挑战。针对麦克道威尔的方案,批评者们分别从＂理由＂概念和＂经验＂概念着手对其进行了批评。文章试图梳理、分析始自戴维森、麦克道威尔的这一论证,通过区分信念之理由的两层涵义并回答某物成为信念之理由的条件是什么这一问题,进而为麦克道威尔的方案提供某种辩护。

英文摘要：

The common sense that perceptual experience can be reasons for belief has become a hot topic since Don- ald Davidson challenged it. In response, John McDowell has developed a concept of experience which has a con- ceptual content, and he believed that such a concept can effectively respond to Davidson＇ s challenge. Many crit- ics, however, have doubted about McDowell＇ s program by analyzing the concept of reason and the concept of expe- rience. This paper tries to provide some defense for McDowell＇ s strategy by distinguishing between two different meanings of reasons for belief and by answering that how something could be a reason for a belief.