中文摘要：

本文以高层梯队理论和心理契约理论为基础，选取2013～2015年我国创业板公司为研究样本，实证分析了管理者既有任期和预期任期与企业双元创新投资的关系，以及产业环境在二者之间起到的调节作用。结果发现：管理者既有任期与探索式创新投资负相关；与开发式创新投资正相关。管理者预期任期与企业探索式创新投资正相关；与企业开发式创新投资相关性不显著。产业环境的动态性在管理者既有任期和双元创新投资之间起到显著调节作用，但在管理者预期任期和双元创新投资之间的调节作用并不显著。这些结论细化了对创新投资行为的研究，对深入分析高管特征对企业创新投资行为的影响具有一定的启示意义。

英文摘要：

Based on the upper echelon theory and the psychological contract theory and using data of companies listed on China＇s Chi-next Board from 2013 to 2015, this paper analyzes the relationship between manager＇s existing tenure and expected tenure and enterprise＇s dual innovation investment, as well as the mediation effects played by industrial environment upon the two. The research finds that manager＇s existing tenure is negatively correlated to the exploratory innovation investment, but is positively correlated to the routine innovation investment. Manager＇s expected tenure is positively correlated to the enterprise＇s exploratory innovation investment. There is no significant correlation between manager＇s expected tenure and routine innovation investment. The dynamic nature of industrial environment plays a significant mediating role between manager＇s actual tenure and dual innovation investment, and an insignificant role between the manager＇s expected tenure and dual innovation investment. These conclusions refine researches on the innovation investment behavior, which provides inspiration for deeper analysis of the influence of manager＇s characteristics on the investment behavior of enterprises.