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中文摘要：
以多任务委托-代理理论为基础,分析工程项目动态联盟运行过程中总包商与分包商间的委托代理关系,设计工程项目合作伙伴管理过程中总包商对分包商的多任务激励模型。在模型优化和求解的基础上,对相对激励强度进行比较静态分析。结果表明,总包商对于重要性高的任务的激励力度高于重要性低的任务的激励力度;同时,对于不确定性较低任务的激励力度也大于不确定性较高任务的激励力度;随着两个任务可替代性的增强,这种较高的激励力度应得到进一步加强,以便合理配置资源,使工程项目联盟的效用最大化。
英文摘要：
According to multi-task principal-agent theory,analyzes the principal-agent relationship between contractor and subcontractor in the operation process of dynamic alliance of engineering project,and designs the multi-task incentive model between contractor and subcontractor in the process of cooperative partner management of engineering project.Based on optimizing and solving the model,the comparative static analysis for the relative incentive intensity is done.The results show that the more important task suits the stronger incentive contract,the stronger incentive contract suits the more uncertain task.The more replacement between two tasks,the stronger incentive contract should give to the task which is more important or uncertain,in order to distribute resources correctly,and improve the utility of dynamic alliance of engineering project.
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