衰退矿区的跨区域进入模式选择影响了企业投资于当地的利润水平以及西部地区的可持续发展。本文以徐州矿务集团公司为例,分析了衰退矿区跨区域战略转移的进入模式绩效,研究表明:低控制模式财务绩效整体上劣于高控制模式,控股模式未必稳定,进入模式绩效可能存在类资源诅咒现象。进而指出,进入模式的资源承诺、控制程度与盈利能力决定了财务绩效的差异性;协调成本决定了控股合资的非稳定性;企业的区位与进入模式风险水平导致了绩效的类资源诅咒性。因此为促使企业以高控制模式进入,降低协调成本与风险水平,建议:①微观层面,跨区域转移的衰退矿区企业必须主动加强与地方政府的沟通和协调,强化企业核心资源的培育,加强控股企业的资源整合;②宏观层面,针对采矿权的市场化,政府可应用法律规定矿产资源市场必须采用公开市场的方式进行招标、竞标、拍卖,建立严格的产权登记制度。对于跨区域开发资源且附带建设基础设施的衰退矿区企业,政府应给予相应的优惠政策。
Strategic transfer of depleted mines is a major challenge facing resource-exhaustible and stated-owned enterprises.There are generally four types of methods to resolve this problem: bankruptcy,restructuring and reorganization industrial restructuring and corporate inter-regional transfer.Nevertheless,two difficulties in replacement of workers and assets appraisal made the first three methods ineffective.Under this background,more than 10 depleted mines such as Yanzhou Mining Group,Zibo Mining Group,Feicheng Mining Group,Longkou Mining Group and Xuzhou Mining Group have transferred or plan to transfer to Xinjiang,Shaanxi,Gansu,Qinghai,Guizhou and Yunnan provinces for new energy exploitation.Depleted mines will adopt different entry modes in strategic decision.Since different entry modes may impact the overall profits of enterprises and sustainable development over western regions in China,it is essential to explore entry mode performance of depleted mines to be transferred to the western provinces.In principle, current studies and the literature seem to be less adequate in performance analysis for a specific industry.To overcome this,the authors performed a study on the entry mode performance of inter-regional strategic transfer on Xuzhou Mining Group.Results indicated that the financial performance of low controlling modes is essentially better than that of high controlling modes. Holding mode might not be stable and similar resource curse phenomenon may exist for entry mode performance.Furthermore,resource commitment and degree of control as well as profitability determine financial performance of entry modes.It was also found that recessive costs, negotiation costs of ownership and costs of incompatible-incentive coordination determine the non-stability of joint venture holding enterprises.Enterprises’locations and entry mode risks due to ownership restriction and resource integration can result in resource curse of entry modes’ performance.Therefore,in order to assist enterprises in entering with high-co