中文摘要：

运用秩依期望效用理论研究鹰鸽博弈模型,在考虑局中人带有情绪因素的条件下研究博弈均衡解的存在性条件以及局中人情绪因素对均衡解的影响规律.研究发现：局中人情绪因素虽然不影响纯战略意义下的博弈均衡解,但对混合战略纳什均衡解存在非常大的影响.如果博弈双方争夺的利益大于双方同时采取＂鹰＂策略时的总成本,则无论局中人情绪如何,博弈不存在混合战略均衡;如果博弈双方争夺的利益小于双方同时采取＂鹰＂策略时的总成本,则当局中人同为悲观情绪且情绪指数的倒数之和小于等于1时,博弈不存在混合战略均衡解;否则,混合战略均衡解存在.特别地,如果博弈双方争夺的利益等于双方同时采取＂鹰＂策略时的总成本,则无论局中人情绪如何,存在且有无数个混合战略均衡.此外,在混合战略均衡存在的条件下,各自的混合均衡战略是分别关于自身或对方情绪指数的单调函数.

英文摘要：

A hawk-dove RDEU-game model has been established based on the rank-dependent utility theory in this paper. It is found that： Although the players＇ emotional factors do not affect the pure strategy equilibri- um, they do affect the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. If the total interest when both sides scrab- ble is more than the total cost when both adopt the ＂hawk＂ strategy, the game mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist whatever the emotions of the players; If the total interests, when both sides scrabble is less than the total cost when they adopt the ＂hawk＂ strategy, or both players are pessimism and the sum of the reciprocal of their sentiment index is less than or equal to 1, the game does not exist mixed strategy equilibrium, either; Otherwise, mixed strategy equilibrium exists. In particular, If the total interests when both sides scrabble is e- qual to the total cost after they adopt the ＂ hawk＂ strategy, there exist numerous mixed strategy equilibrium whatever the players＇ emotions arc. In addition, in mixed strategy equilibrium, their mixed strategy equilibri- um all are monotonous functions of their own or the other＇s sentiment index, respectively.