中文摘要：

众筹作为舶来品进入中国市场以来，发展快速且竞争激烈，电商平台也凭借其流量优势强势进入，但却没有出现我国商业中常用的新用户优惠定价策略。在众筹平台不对项目收费假设前提下，以项目发起人的利润最大化和平台方利益最大化为目标，构建了动态双寡头垄断模型。研究证明：在不考虑双平台共同客户情况下，优惠定价最终使两平台平分市场；在考虑共同用户影响下，当两平台初始市场份额差距不大时，平台和发起人均不存在优惠定价的动机，当两平台初始市场份额差距较大时，发起方存在优惠定价的动机。由于共同客户完全弹性，优惠定价会使两平台忠诚客户逐渐变少，最终两寡头会彻底失去产品定价能力。这种理性冲突使得众筹市场不存在新用户优惠定价现象。

英文摘要：

Since coming to Chinese market in 2012, crowdfunding develop rapidly and compete sharply, lots of electric business platforms, with its data traffic advantage, strongly enter the market, but no preferential pricing for some new customers. Based on the assumption that the platform is not charged to the project, the paper con- structs a dynamic double oligopoly model with the goal of maximizing the profit of the project sponsor and maxi- mizing the benefit of the platform. This paper proves that： Without considering the common customers preferen- tial pricing, the two platform would split the market. In considering the effect of common customers, if little ini- tial market share gap between two platforms, both of sponsor and platform are no incentive to launch preferential pricing. But if else, sponsor is but platform is not. Due to the common customer fully flexible, preferential pricing will make the two platform loyal customers gradually less and less, the final two oligopoly will completely lose product pricing power. This rational conflict makes the market no preferential pricing.