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中文摘要：
规制市场的垄断结构和基于“权利”的法哲学原理下的监管理念导致农村金融市场的双重迷失，垄断结构下的单一规制服务无法适应异质性的农村信贷市场，垄断供给者所要求的最低收益和平均定价所形成的门槛效应将小规模农村金融机构排斥在规制市场之外。这三个因素导致农村正规金融市场的迷失。同时，基于“权利”的法哲学原理所产生的“凡未经明文允许的事均被禁止”之监管原则又视民间金融为“非法”。相应地。内生于农村信贷市场的监管模式应该是基于“经济自由”的功能型监管：以分散决策和充分竞争下的多重均衡提供专门化、多元化的规制服务，促进正式金融向农村扩展；同时，放开民间金融并对之进行非审慎性监管。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we assert that the market structure of regulation service and the idea of regulation based on the philosophy of right leading to duel - lost of rural financial market. Unified regulation service under the monopoly structure cannot well apply to heterogeneous rural markets,and threshold effects generated by the least required payoff and average price reject small - scale rural credit out of market. The system effect of these three effects leads to the lost of rural formal market. Generated by the philosophy of right, the principle of regulation detailed as ＂ affairs without permission of expressly stipulation will be prohibited＂ regards informal finance as illegal. Accordingly, endogenous patterns of regulation derived from rural financial development should be based on the functional regulation： to provide specializing and diversifying regulation services under disperse policy decision and sufficient competition,in order to promote the expansion of formal finance towards rural area; at the same time, to unlock informal finance and loose the regulation towards it.
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