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中文摘要：
针对逆向选择和道德风险问题,从风险投资者角度出发,基于委托代理关系建立了风险投资家激励契约模型。与传统的激励契约模型相比,该模型考虑了风险投资家对风险投资基金注入一定比例的个人资本金而持有股份,并引入了风险投资者可观测变量。研究结果表明,该模型增加了风险投资家的激励强度,提高了风险投资者的期望收入,还有助于风险投资者选择高能力的风险投资家和激励其在签约后努力工作。这些结果有益于解决逆向选择和道德风险问题,并为风险投资者建立合理的激励契约提供了理论依据。
英文摘要：
In view of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems and from the perspective of venture investor,an incentive contracts model for venture capitalist is set up based on the principal-agent relationship in this paper.This model differs from traditional incentive contracts models in considering venture capitalist＇s own investment in venture funds and an observable variable for venture investor.The theoretical research shows that the contracts model can raise the incentive intensity and increase venture investor＇s expected income.The incentive contracts model is helpful for venture investor to choose the venture capitalist of high ability and inspire the venture capitalist to work hard after signing the contracts and is effective to solve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems.Based on this model,venture investor can establish a reasonable incentive contracts for the venture capitalist.
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