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中文摘要：
风险投资家和风险企业家之间的控制权分配以及风险企业股权结构形成了风险投资的有效激励机制。在风险企业家拥有完全控制权的情况下，讨论了事前合约中风险投资家的持股比例问题。与传统的风险投资激励机制研究不同之处在于，综合考虑了控制权分配以及持股比例对激励机制的影响，关注在一定控制权分配下，能规避事后再谈判的风险投资家持股比例的约束条件。理论研究结果表明，当风险项目满足一个强约束时，不会发生道德风险；当风险项目满足一个弱约束而不能满足强约束时，存在一定约束下的持股比例以规避道德风险；而当风险项目甚至不能满足弱约束时，则事前持股比例的约定并不能规避道德风险，此时事后再谈判成为可能。
英文摘要：
The allocation of control right between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur as well as ownership structure form the effective incentives for venture capital. This paper discussed the problem of shareholding ratio by venture capitalist in the ex ante contract under the control by entrepreneur. The different from the traditional research of incentives is that this paper considered the impact of allocation of the control right and shareholding ratio for incentives and focused on the constraints of ex ante shareholding ratio which can avoid renegotiation in a given allocation of control right. The theoretical researches shows that when the risk project satisfied a strong constraint, moral hazard does not occur; when the risk project satisfied a weak constraint but not strong constraint, there exist bounded shareholding ratios which can avoid the moral hazard; and when the risk project even not satisfied the weak constraint, any agreement of the shareholding ratio can not avoid the moral hazard and in this time. The post inefficiency makes ex post negotiation is impossible.
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