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中文摘要：
针对供应链金融中核心企业为中小企业提供回购担保的存货质押融资业务,考虑核心企业与中小企业,银行与企业（核心企业和中小企业的整体）发生双重S tacke lberg博弈,建立了中小企业、核心企业和银行各自的期望利润最大化模型;然后通过逆向归纳法求解双重博弈,逐步分析中小企业的产品订购决策,核心企业的批发价格决策和银行的产品回购担保要求、质押融资贷款利率决策。研究表明,当双重S tacke lberg博弈存在均衡结果时,产品回购担保要求和质押融资贷款利率的银行信贷决策机制必定满足一定条件组合,并且中小企业产品订购数量与核心企业批发价格、银行贷款利率负相关,与银行回购担保要求正相关。
英文摘要：
Concerning core enterprises＇ buy-back guarantee against small and medium-sized enterprises＇ inventory financing,this paper establishes the expect-profit-maximization models for the bank,the core enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises when they game in Stackelberg.Then the article analyzes the small and medium-sized enterprises＇ order decision,the core enterprises＇ wholesale price decision and the bank＇s buy-back guarantee request and lending rate decisions during solving the two Stackelberg models.Research results show that when there is an equilibrium solution to the two Stackelberg models,the bank＇s buy-back guarantee request and lending rate must satisfy some conditions,and that the small and medium-sized enterprises＇ order quantity negatively correlate to the core enterprises＇ wholesale price or the bank＇s lending rate,positively correlate to the bank＇s buy-back guarantee request.
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