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中文摘要：
基于演化博弈理论,从由两家中小企业所组成的联保贷款组织入手,分析组织可持续稳定发展的条件;进一步,将模型拓展至多家中小企业的情形,并纳入组织内激励惩罚机制,探究联保贷款组织信用行为的演化机理.研究发现：建立合理的进入退出机制是有效管控联保组织信用风险的关键;最后基于多智能体仿真方法,考察了联保组织规模与组织成员初始信用水平对于联保组织信用风险演化的影响,并为银行等贷款机构和联保组织自身管控信用风险给出相应的建议.
英文摘要：
Based on the evolutionary game theory, a guaranteed loans organization composed by two middle- small enterprise（SMEs） is analyzed, then the conditions for sustainable and stable development of the orga- nization are analyzed; furthermore, in order to explore the evolutionary mechanism of the credit behavior of guaranteed loans organizations, we expand the model to the scene of a larger number of SMEs, while consid- ering the factor of incentive punishment mechanism within the organization. The study finds that： establishing a reasonable entry and exit mechanism is the key to effective control of the credit risk of the guaranteed loans organization; in addition, based on multi-agent simulation methods, we examine the impact of the initial credit level of the members and the size of the guaranteed loans organization on the evolution of credit risk, and some recommendations on the credit risk control are given to the banks and other lending institutions according to the findings.
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