欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
本文从实物投资的角度,考虑了委托代理下的管理者内生化薪酬问题,研究了管理者特质（乐观和自信）对投资时机和最优薪酬的影响。利用实物期权方法,本文得到了最优薪酬的解析解。研究发现合理的薪酬可以消除股东-管理者之间的委托代理问题。最优股权份额随着管理者的乐观、自信程度增加而减少;最优投资时机随着管理者的乐观、自信程度的增加而降低。同时,乐观自信的管理者更偏向于外部融资。
英文摘要：
This paper first examines the endogenous compensation of manager under principle-agent problem in a real options framework.Then it studies that the impacts of manager＇s traits（optimism and confidence）on investment trigger and the optimal compensation.Utilizing the real options approach,this model explicitly derives the optimal compensation.Results show that：the appropriate compensation can rule out the principle-agent problem between the owner and the manager;the optimal compensation and the optimal investment trigger decrease with the degree of manager＇s traits;optimistic and confident managers have inclination to external financing.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Learning, Pricing, Timing and Hedging of the Option to Invest for Perpetual Cash Flows with Idiosync
A New Method for Setting Futures Portfolios’ Maintenance Margins: Evidence from Chinese Commodity Fu
The expected discounted penalty function for two classes of risk processes perturbed by diffusion wi
Cross-correlations between WTI crude oil market and U.S. stock market: A perspective from econophysi
Utility-Based Pricing, Timing and Hedging of an American Call Option under an Incomplete Market with
Almost Everywhere Convergence of Riesz Means Related to Schrodinger Operator with Constan Magnetic F
Correlation structure and dynamics of international real estate securities markets: A network perspe
Optimal Proportional Reinsurance and Investment Problem with Constraints on Risk Control in a Genera
On the expected discounted penalty function for the classic risk model with potentially delayed clai
期刊信息
位置：