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高管薪酬激励效果——基于投资-现金流敏感度的分析

ISSN号：1006-480X
期刊名称：《中国工业经济》
时间：0
分类：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
作者机构：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079, [2]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819
相关基金：国家自然科学基金重点项目“战略导人的投资决策与风险管理”（批准号71031004）;国家自然科学基金面上项目“金融极端事件的定量化研究及其在金融危机中的应用：基于时间维及空间维双重视角”（批准号71271047）;国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目“金融创新与风险管理”（批准号71221001）.

关键词：高管薪酬, 投资—现金流敏感度, 薪酬—业绩敏感度, 门限回归, executive compensation, investment-cash flow sensitivity, pay-performance sensitivity, thresholdregression

中文摘要：

高管薪酬激励的效果常常受制于各种因素,本文从公司经营的微观环境角度,通过构建公司利润最大化模型推导发现,衡量高管薪酬激励的常用代理变量高管薪酬一业绩敏感度是关于投资—现金流敏感度的增函数,表明存在融资约束的公司,其高管薪酬激励效果会更好,这一结论得到了以2007—2013年A股上市公司为样本的实证检验的证实。而进一步的分样本研究发现,在融资约束程度较小的公司和国有企业这两个子样本中,高管薪酬—业绩敏感度与投资—现金流敏感度关系并不显著,这提示后者对前者的影响可能存在门限效应。门限回归的结果显示,由投资—现金流敏感度表示的融资约束程度在门限值以上时,薪酬激励效果显著,而在门限值以下则不显著。这些结论一方面说明国有企业中普遍存在的“融资软约束”弱化了薪酬激励效果,另一方面说明为达到最优激励效果,公司制定高管薪酬时应根据融资约束程度的动态变化适时调整。本文的发现不仅为高管薪酬激励评价提供了新视角,为长期激励提供了除股权激励以外的替代方案,而且为国有企业进一步市场化改革的迫切性提供了新证据。

英文摘要：

The effect of executive compensation perspective of enterprise management, this paper builds incentive is often subject to various factors. From the a company profit maximization model and finds that the t of pay-performance executive incentive compensation sensitivity act positively with investment- cash flow sensitivity, indicating that while the enterprise financing constraints exists, the executive compensation incentive effect will perform better. This conclusion is accord with the empirical test based on the 2007--2013 listed companies. Further study finds that, in the less financing constrained companies and state-owned enterprises, the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and investment-cash flow sensitivity is not significant, which suggests that there may exist a threshold effect. Further study of threshold regression results show that, the salary incentive effect is significant when the firm＇s degree of financing constraints are above the threshold. However, this is not significant when the financing constraints are below the threshold. On one hand, these conclusions suggest that, in the state-owned enterprises, ＂financing soft constraints＂ have weakened the salary incentive effect. On the other hand, to achieve the optimal incentive effect, the executive compensation should be changed dynamically according to the degree of financing constraints. The discovery of this paper not only offers a new perspective for the study of executive compensation incentive evaluation, an alternative plan other than the equity incentive plan for long-term incentive, but also provides a new evidence to the urgency of the further market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises.