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中文摘要：
信用卡产业在我国已步入快速发展的轨道，然而宽松的发卡策略加剧了持卡人和发卡行之间的信息不对称，继而诱发信用卡支付危机。鉴于此，在声誉（KMRW）博弈模型基础上建立了发卡行和持卡人之间的声誉博弈模型，分析了持卡人、发卡行的声誉与信用卡市场上的信息不对称之间的关系，提出引进第三方治理机制作为KMRW模型自我实施机制的加强和补充，以更有效地缓解信用卡市场上的信息不对称。
英文摘要：
Based on the analysis of the game among card issuers, the paper explains the best competitive strategy of the bank credit card. Since the card issuers loosen the credit standards, it may aggravate the information asymmetry between card issuer and cardholder, which may result in the crisis of the credit card payment. The paper establishes the reputation game model based on the KMRW game model, which analyzes the relationship of their reputation and the information asymmetry among them. It proposes the third - party governance mechanism to strengthen and supplement the self- implementing mechanisms of KMRW model in order to ease the information asymmetry.
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