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中文摘要：
跳单现象在很多领域都普遍存在,文章利用博弈论的方法分析了在团购O2O环境下平台企业和加盟供应商间检查和跳单的博弈过程。首先通过分析静态博弈模型,发现跳单现象是不可避免的;其次通过放宽假设分析两阶段动态模型,发现供应商的最优跳单量和平台的检查成本系数、跳单损失系数、惩罚系数等有关,平台企业可以通过调整这些系数使得供应商跳单量在自己可控的范围内。
英文摘要：
Jump-Dealing is widespread in many fields. The game process between the Group-Buying O2O platform and providers is analyzed. Firstly, using the static Game Model, this paper finds that jump-dealing is inevitable. Secondly, through relaxing the assumption condition, this paper finds the relationship between the provider＇s optimal number of Jump-Dealing and the platform＇s degree of checking cost, degree of Jump-Dealing loss, and degree of punishment. The platform can control the provider＇s number of Jump-Dealing through adjusting these coefficients in order to improve the performance.
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