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中文摘要：
高管薪酬激励已成为现代公司治理的重要内容，伴随着中国股权激励机制的推行，上市公司高管薪酬结构随之发生变化，最终可能影响上市公司权益资本成本。利用基于真实数据的混合截面模型预测公司盈余，在此基础上通过GLs模型、OJN模型和GGM模型估算权益资本成本，以股权分置改革后2007年至2012年上市公司为样本，探究股改后中国上市公司股权激励对高管内部薪酬差距的影响，在这种影响下公司权益资本成本的变化。研究结果表明，股权激励计划的实施已成为高管内部薪酬差距扩大的主要因素；在股权激励作用下，高管内部薪酬差距的扩大增加企业权益资本成本；与非国有控股企业相比，国有控股企业中股权激励与高管内部薪酬差距的相互作用与权益资本成本敏感性更高。研究结论为高管薪酬激励制度的完善提供重要启示，也为投资者识别股权激励计划的实施效果提供经验证据。
英文摘要：
Executive compensation incentive has become an important part of modern corporate governance, along with the implementation of equity incentive mechanism, the strueture of executive pay in listed companies will change and these changes would affect the cost of equity capital of listed companies. Using the cross-seetional model that based on real data to forecast earnings, and then estimate the cost of equity capital through the GI.S model, OJN model and GGM model, this study takes samples of lis- ted companies from 2007 to 2012 after the state share refornl to explore the influence of China＇s listed company equity incentive on executive internal pay gap, and discuss the changes of the cost of equity capital under this intluence. The results show that the implementation of equity incentive plan has been the key factor to intensify executive internal pay gap; due to the influence of equity incentive, internal executive pay gap increases the cost of equity capital; in state-owned enterprises, the interacting effect of equity incentive and internal executive pay gap has higher sensitivity with the cost of equity capital compared with effects in nonstate-owned enterprises. Our study not only brings important enlightenments for the improvement of executive compensation incentive system, also provides empirical evidence for investors on the influence of implementation of equity incentive plans.
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