中文摘要：

基于前人对于控制权制衡的研究及我国的现实情况，作者提出了上市公司控制权制衡与关联并购行为之间关系的假设，并运用我国上市公司1998-2004年间的关联并购数据，对假设进行了二项逻辑回归分析。本文验证了第一大股东投票权指数越大即基于博弈的控制权越大关联并购行为越少；附属于集团公司的上市公司更倾向于关联并购行为。基于股权比例的竞争力指标与关联并购行为发生的关系并不明显；第二大股东投票权指数越大，关联并购行为越多，从而证明上市公司大股东之间存在一定的共谋关系。

英文摘要：

Based on the literature of corporate control balance and the current situation of Chinese listed companies, some hypotheses on the relationship of corporate control balance and M＆A with related party （MARP） of Chinese listed companies are developed. Using data of merger with related party of Chinese listed companies from 1998 to 2004, we test the hypotheses in the binary logistic regression method. The result shows that the concentration of corporate control of listed company has negative correlation with the activity of MARP. A listed company affiliated with another company is more likely to merge with related party than a listed company not affiliated with any company. The relationship between competition index of ownership and MARP is not significant. The power index of block holder, who holds biggest stocks, has negative correlation with the activity of MARP. But the power index of block holder, who holds second biggest shares, has positive correlation with the activity of MARP. There must be some collusion between block shareholders.