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中文摘要：
考虑到私人运营商追求运营利润最大和政府追求社会总成本最小的特性,本文构建了三层Stackelberg博弈模型,研究当政府拥有所有的停车位时,私人运营商追求运营利润最大和政府以社会总成本最小为目标的停车位分配策略和停车费定价问题.在模型中,首先,政府决定转让多少个停车位的经营权给私人运营商,接着,根据停车位数量具体的分配情况,政府和私人运营商共同决定停车收费的价格,最后,出行者参考制定的停车位的收费价格来选择自己的出行方式和出行路径.数值算例对不同的交通管理策略进行了比较分析.
英文摘要：
When the government owns all the parking space, three-stage Stackelberg models is introduced to solve the parking space allocation and parking pricing problem. The objective of the government is to minimize the total social cost and that of the private firm is to maximize profit. The government decides how many parking spaces management right are transferred to private firms in the first stage. Then, the government and private firms determine the parking fee at the same time based on the parking space allocation. At the final stage, travelers make their mode choice and route choice by considering the parking fees. Numerical examples are presented to compare and analyze the influence of different traffic management strategies.
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A new mechanism for metastability of under-saturated traffic responsible for time-delayed traffic br
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