探讨在零售商的风险规避度分别为完全信息和私有信息2种情况下的供应链决策问题,比较2种情况下的最优决策值发现:制造商的直销渠道价格不受风险规避度是否信息私有的影响。制造商的最优批发价格和零售商的最优零售渠道价格随制造商掌握的风险规避度均值的变化而变化。数值算例验证了该结论,并计算存在直销渠道价格不能小于批发价格约束时的最优决策值。通过对无约束和有约束情况下最优决策值的比较表明:虽然2种情况下产品的市场销售总量不变,但约束条件的存在能够减弱直销渠道对传统零售渠道的影响。
For a dual channel supply chain with a risk averse manufacturer and a risk averse retailer, this paper studies the wholesale price and the prices of direct channel and traditional retailing channel under complete information and asymmetric information separately. By comparing the optimal decisions under both conditions, the direct price is not affected by the asymmetric information. The optimal wholesale price and the retailing price change with the mean of the risk-aversion measure. The conclusion is supported by the numerical example. It also analyzes the optimal decisions under the constraint that the direct price can not be less than the wholesale price. The comparison of the optimal decisions with or without constraint illustrates that the whole quantity of sold products is changeless. But the constraint weakens the influence of direct channel on traditional retailing channel.