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中文摘要：
考虑政府根据BOT项目的建设成本大小规划项目的有效运营期并将其一部分作为特许权期转让给项目公司,建立了项目公司投资和政府特许权期的博弈模型,并运用Stackelberg博弈方法分析了各自的最优策略问题,从而获得了BOT项目投资与特许权期最优决策模型,它为项目公司和政府提供了对BOT项目决策的一种理论方法.
英文摘要：
Based on the Stackelberg game,it is important for the government to determine the efficient operational period of BOT project according to the building cost and transfer one part of efficient operational period as the concession term to the project company.To describe the competition between the government and the project company,a game model is proposed.The optimal concession term for the government and the best investment for the project company are obtained respectively by solving the model.It can provide the government and the project company with a decision-making support for BOT project.
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