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中文摘要：
这份报纸把随机的进化比赛理论用于在一个多公司联盟对外部机会主义在成员之中分析合作的稳定性。作者首先在决定上考察恰当的传统的模型，然后一个随机的游戏模型的利弊在一个协作参数，一个时间变量，惩罚效果和围住的合理性被考虑的地方，被建议。高斯白人噪音被介绍在这个过程反映随机的骚乱。稳定性上的几个足够的标准被开发，它使我们能调查 if-thentype 情形并且投射不同策略的影响。
英文摘要：
This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of coop- eration among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance. The authors first review the pros and cons of pertinent traditional models, and then a stochastic game model on decisions is proposed, where a coordination parameter, a time variable, a punishment effect and bounded ratio- nality are considered. The Gauss white noise is introduced to reflect the random disturbance in the process. Several sufficient criteria on stability are developed, which enable us to investigate ＂if-then＂ type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.
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