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中文摘要：
随着国家对农田水利投入的加大,如何激励农田水利工程使用主体———农民参与工程建设非常关键。由于农田水利设施的公共品属性,使得在参与其建设时,农民容易采取＂搭便车＂行为。利用博弈理论,首先建立了完全理性的农民参与农田水利建设的重复博弈模型,然后假设农民在博弈过程中会＂犯错误＂,通过求解和证明可以得到农民达成＂合作＂均衡的条件,最后总结了博弈达成合作稳定策略的内在机理,并针对农民参与农田水利建设现状给出了相应的对策与建议,以期为农户参与农田水利设施建设制度创新提供依据。
英文摘要：
With the increasing investment in irrigation,how to encourage farmers to participate in the construction of irrigation is very important.Irrigation facilities are for public use,the farmers tend to show a ＂free rider＂ behavior in the irrigation construction.This paper firstly establishes the game model of the rational farmers.It also establishes the model in the situation that the farmers will make mistakes.The solution of the model is the equilibrium that farmers get cooperation strategy.At last,this paper illuminates the internal mechanism that all people get cooperation strategy,also give some advice for the dilemma that farmers didn＇t want to participate in the construction of irrigation.It tries to provide the basis for system innovation in the mechanism design of farmers＇ participation in the irrigation construction.
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