欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
首先建立了完全信息下政府的管理模型,然后利用激励理论,在不完全信息下设计1组契约来揭露农户真实的产出类型,建立了政府带审核手段的激励模型,给出了改进的补偿机制,并对模型的结果进行了讨论,得到了一个面源污染补偿的形成机制.新机制通过农户的＂自我申报＂实现了环境管理者的管理目标.最后通过算例说明了机制的有效性,并解释了效率损失的原因.
英文摘要：
A management model is first established under complete information,and then a contract is made to expose the farmers＇ production type under incomplete information by incentive theory.An incentive model with government＇s auditing is presented,which improves the compensation model.A discussion is held on the model＇s result,as a result,the compensation mechanism of non-point source pollution is obtained.The new mechanism can realize the management goal by farmers＇ self-declaration.At last,a numerical example validates the approach.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Prisoner';s Dilemma Games on Barabasi-Albert Networks with De
A fuzzy multi-objective model for provider selection in data communication services with different Q
Learning algorithm and the cooperation behavior of continuous prisoner's dilemma game on complex net
期刊信息
位置：