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中文摘要：
媒体通过信息传播功能满足投资者的治理需求，在IPO前起到降低信息不对称的作用，但国有股份所释放的政策信号会与媒体的治理效应产生替代性。基于2009年至2012年中国A股上市公司的869家IPO样本数据，采用横截面数据的OLS多元回归和分组回归等实证研究方法，探索信息不对称环境下媒体参与公司治理的动因及治理效应问题，并验证国有股份的存在对其治理效应的替代性。研究结果表明，代理成本与媒体负面报道比例正相关，该结论与代理理论的逻辑相符，即公司IPO前媒体可以通过信息传播降低信息不对称，在信息不对称程度较高的公司媒体的治理效应更加明显。将政策信号纳入考虑范围后，相对于存在国有股份而言，无政策信号组媒体弥补信息不对称的治理效应更为突出，表明媒体的信息传播效应会被国有股份的政策信号所替代。
英文摘要：
Media coverage meets the investor＇s governance need through information transmission, which reduces the information asymmetry between investors and managers. The policy signal of state-ownership companies would replace the governance effect of media coverage. Using the initial public offering data from 869 A-share listed companies during 2009-2012 in China, we adopt OLS multiple regression and grouped regression model to examine the motivation of the media involving in the corporate governance framework and the governance effect of media under the environment of information asymmetry. At the same time, we empirically test the substitution effect of the existence of state ownership on the governance effect of media coverage. The results show that Agency costs is positively related to the proportion of negative negative media coverage. Our conclusion conforms with the agency theory, which verifies that the media could induce information asymmetry through information transmission before IPO, and that the effect is more obvious in companies with higher information asymmetry. After grouping by the ownership, the paper finds that the media＇s information governance effect is more salient in companies without state-ownership instead of companies with state-ownership, which strengthens the hypothesis that the information transmission effect of media will be neutralized by policy signal of state-ownership.
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