中文摘要：

采用管制最优规划模型,同时考虑减排成本、监督成本和惩罚成本,以市场激励型的碳税政策为研究对象,对最优成本效率的碳税定价策略进行了分析.研究表明：在监管者对企业减排行为具有不确定信息的条件下,企业保证完全遵守的条件是税率水平不高于边际惩罚函数;当惩罚函数为非恒定形式时,企业完全遵守条件下税率水平应不低于边际惩罚成本与边际监督成本之商,企业不完全遵守条件下的最优策略是监管者变动排放标准的边际成本等于变动监督概率边际成本;当惩罚函数为恒定时仅当检测概率对于公司实际排放量是严格单增函数时可以实现税收政策的最优.

英文摘要：

The regulatory optimal plan model is adopted, taking overall consideration of the abatement costs, monitoring costs and the sanctioning costs, and the conditions of optimal cost-effective regulatory decisions of carbon tax policy are derived. Conclusions are as follows： when regulators has incomplete information about the enterprise＇ s reduction behavior, the condition of keeping enterprise full compliance is the tax rate should not be higher than the marginal punishing function; Under the inconstant marginal penalty function, the enterprise＇s full compliance with tax rate shall be no less than the marginal cost divided by marginal monitoring cost, while the marginal cost of changing carbon emissions standards should be equal to the marginal cost of changing monitoring probability when the enterprise is not compliance. Relative to the optimal policy with a constant marginal penalty, the tax policy is optimal only when the probability of monitoring is a strictly increasing function of the actual emissions.