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中文摘要：
从政策企业家视角出发,建立演化博弈模型,探讨在碳排放权交易过程中,具有企业性质的碳交易监管机构——碳排放权交易管理中心与企业之间的博弈关系,探析碳配额决策因子和惩罚因子与降低市场违约风险的关系。结果发现：当企业实际碳排量大于高配额决策的初始配额量时,企业只能通过购买新的配额来补充排碳缺口,或接受违约惩罚;当企业实际排碳量较低时,一味要求高初始配额可能会减少企业的交易利润;为降低市场违约风险,碳配额决策因子β1为企业预计排量与历史排量比值的最大值,β2为企业预计排量与历史排量比值的最小值,惩罚因子η的取值范围满足η〉2。
英文摘要：
From the perspective of policy entrepreneurs,this paper set up evolutionary game model and discussed the game relationship between the enterprises and the carbon emissions trading management center,in the process of carbon emissions trading. And then,it analyzed the relationship between the carbon quotas decision and punishment factor with reducing default risk of market. Result showed that,with the actual carbon emissions higher than initial quota,enterprises can only buy new quotas to supplement gap of carbon,or accept the default penalty; with a low carbon emissions,blindly requiring high initial quota may reduce the trading profits of enterprise; in order to reduce default risk of market,carbon quotas decision factor β1is a maximum ratio of enterprise estimated emission value to the historical value,β2is the minimum ratio of enterprise estimated emission value to the historical value,the scope of penalty factor η is η〉2.
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