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中文摘要：
根据新农保试点的跟踪调查结果，大多数参保农民都选择了最低的个人账户缴费档次。分析了个人账户财政补贴激励和政策认知程度对农民参保缴费档次选择的影响，利用有序Probit模型和东北地区调查样本数据对此问题进行了实证检验。在较高的政策认知条件下，“差别化”财政补贴方式比“一刀切”方式显著提高参保农民的缴费档次选择。其政策含义是在提高农民对新农保的政策认知程度基础上，依据个人账户的不同缴费档次建立多缴多补的“差别化”财政补贴激励机制，以引导农民自发选择较高缴费档次，从而提高新农保替代率水平。
英文摘要：
to the follow - up survey about the pilot of New Rural Pension System, the majority of peasants had chosen the lowest contribution grade. This paper analyzes the relation of policy cognition, financial subsidy incentive and the choice of the contribution grade of per- sonal account using the positive test based on the Ordered Probit Model and micro data of Northeast China. It is concluded that the ＂differentiation＂ financial subsidy can improve signifi- candy peasants＇ contribution grade choice compared with ＂one - size - fits - all＂ financial sub- siay if they have higher policy cognition. It means that both the improvement of peasants＇ cogni- tion to New Rural Pension System and the establishment of incentive mechanism by the ＂Differ- ence＂ financial subsidy according to various contribution grade of the personal account are essen- tial to improve peasants＇ contribution grade choice,which is very important to ensure necessary replacement rate of New Rural Pension System.
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