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中文摘要：
研究由一个努力减排的制造商和一个努力促销的零售商组成的双渠道供应链的减排与促销决策问题。首先建立分散决策和集中决策下供应链成员的Stackelberg博弈模型，表明集中决策会激励制造商努力减排、零售商努力促销及提高供应链整体利润，为此提出合作减排、合作促销和成本互担3种合作模式，分别构建博弈模型来分析均衡解。研究表明：3种合作方式分别在不同的条件下能提高供应链及各成员的利润，但是合作减排方式不能激励零售商努力促销、合作促销方式不能激励制造商努力减排，而成本互担方式能同时激励制造商努力减排水平和零售商努力促销。最后通过数值仿真验证模型的有效性，并对比分析3种合作方式下消费者对直销渠道的偏好对供应链成员利润的影响。
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes the cooperative carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion in a dual- channel supply chain involved one manufacturer and one retailer. Assuming that demands were affected by the manufacturer＇s reduction and the retailer＇s promotion, a Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer is established which indicates that the centralized decision will encourage manufacturers to make more efforts to reduce the emission, and the retailer to make more efforts to promote and improve the profit of the whole supply chain. Then three contract models of cooperation reduction, cooperation promotion and cost sharing are put forward and the game models are constructed to analyze the equilibrium solution. Research shows that three ways of contract under different conditions can all improve the supply chain; however, the contract of cooperation reduction cannot motivate the retailer to make more efforts to promote, what＇s more the contract of cooperation promotion cannot incentive the manufacturer to make more efforts to reduce the emission, but the contract of cost sharing can both motivate the manufacturer to take more efforts to reduce emissions and the retailer to make more efforts to promote. A further research is carried on that the validity of the models is verified by numerical simulation, and the effect of the consumer＇s preference on direct channel on the supply chain members＇ profits are compared and analyzed in three contracts. Our key contribution lies in modeling the contrasts under different conditions to coordinate the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer.
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