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中文摘要：
以我国2002~2007年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,探讨官员晋升竞争对于企业税负的影响。研究发现,官员晋升竞争通过动力机制与压力机制对地区企业实际税负构成影响;动力机制方面,地方官员竞争动力越强烈,所在企业实际税负越高;压力机制方面,地方官员考核压力越重,所在企业实际税负越高;晋升竞争对于企业实际税负的影响因所有权性质而异;市场化水平对晋升竞争与企业实际税负具有显著的调节效应。
英文摘要：
Based on a sample of manufacturing listed companies from 2002 to 2007, this paper studies the effects of political competition on the corporate effective tax burden. It shows that political competition affect the regional corporate effective tax burden through incentive mechanism and pressure mechanism. The local government with stronger promotion incentive and political performance evaluation pressure, the regional corporate are more likely to bear higher effective tax burden. The results also shows that the effect of political competition on the corporate effective tax burden differs in state-owned and private companies. Furthermore, the marketization degree has in- fluence on the relationship between political competition and corporate effective tax burden.
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