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中文摘要：
针对供需网的一个典型节点，研究随机需求情形下零售商主导的供需网契约协调问题。考虑由一个风险厌恶的零售商和一个风险厌恶的制造商构成的两层供需系统，零售商制定最优批发价，制造商决定最优供货量，构建了基于收益共享费用共担的供需网协调模型。仿真分析结果表明，当整个供需系统的风险厌恶系数高于制造商和零售商的风险厌恶系数时，收益共享费用共担契约可以实现系统的显著改善甚至完美协调。
英文摘要：
Abstract： This paper studied the coordination of a two-tier supply and demand system under stochastic demand. It considered a two-stage supply and demand system which consisted one risk-averse retailer and one risk-averse manufacturer-retailer had wholesale pricing power, manufacturer decided the optimal quantity. It built a system coordination model based on gain/cost sharing contract, got the optimal expression of wholesale price, sale effort and order quantity. Through the simulation, it ana- lysed the effects of manufacturer＇ s and retailer＇ s risk aversion coefficient on supply and demand system through numerical example. It also proved that when the loss aversion coefficient of the system is bigger than manufacturer＇ s and retailer＇ s risk aversion coefficient, gain/cost sharing contract can coordinate the system completely.
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