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中文摘要：
假定线段城市上的两个厂商执行歧视价格,分析了外部专利权人和内部专利权人的专利授权策略。对于外部专利权人,通过可变费方式授权与通过固定费方式授权获得相同的收益。对内部专利权人,当专利是激烈的,不授权最优,当专利是非激烈的,通过可变费方式授权最优。
英文摘要：
The optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms practice price-discrimination is considered. There is no difference between royalty licensing and fix-fee licensing for an outsider patentee. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic.
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