中文摘要：

在文献回顾的基础上，可知知识联盟知识收益的分配对知识联盟的成功有决定作用。考虑知识联盟内生信息和外生信息不对称导致的联盟成员的道德风险存在，提出努力程度（共享水平）和创新成本等变量，来设计知识联盟的知识收益契约。利用微分方程对契约进行分析，得知：知识联盟成员企业追求自身最大利益时所付出的知识创造努力水平与自身的分配系数成正比，与自身的贡献系数成正比，与自身创新成本系数的平方成反比，并最终得出知识联盟的最优分配系数。最后总结结论，并提出简要对策。

英文摘要：

On the basis of reference review, the paper reaches the conclusion that knowledge alliance＇ s knowledge income distribution plays an important role in its success. Knowledge alliance of endogenous and exogenous information asymmetry leads to the existence of moral hazard. The paper designs knowledge income distribution contract on the basis of consideration effort （shared level） and innovation costs and other variables, analyzes the knowledge income distribution contract by differential equation, and shows that： Knowledge alliance member companies to pursue their own best interest to pay the level of knowledge creation and its distribution coefficient is pro- portional, with its own contribution to the coefficient proportional to the square of its coefficient is inversely proportional to the cost of innovation. And the paper gets the optimal distribution coefficient of the knowledge alliance. Finally, the paper summaries conclusions, and proposes brief countermeasures.