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中文摘要：
为研究供应链成员的风险态度对供应链中断风险的影响，采用演化博弈理论方法，建立了供应商与零售商行为交互的演化博弈模型，研究了决策参数的变化对演化结果的影响，并用数值仿真展示了决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响。研究发现，供应商和零售商风险态度的路径演化系统收敛于两种模式，既可以向良好状态演化，也可以向不良状态演化，并形成“锁定”；通过调节参数，系统可以跳出不良“锁定”状态。
英文摘要：
To study the effect of risk attitude of the supply chain members on supply chain disruption risk, an evolutionary game model is built to show the interaction between the suppliers and the retailers using evolutionary game theory and method. The influence of variety of decision-making parameters on evolution results is discussed. The effect of changing decision making parameters and initial condition on the evolution results are shown by numerical simulations. It is found that the system converges to two types of patterns; the good state and the bad state. Moreover, behavior evolution routes of the suppliers and the retailers can be optimized through control of parameters.
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