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中文摘要：
本文构建了非对称信息条件下,科学数据共享系统中政府与共享主体的委托代理模型, 并结合共享主体的风险偏好对双方的风险分担进行了分析,同时给出了模型的应用和讨论.模型通过政府（委托人）对共享主体（代理人）的最优激励合同设计,能在双方信息不对称条件下,促使共享主体努力实现数据资源的共享,促进共享系统的有效运行.
英文摘要：
This paper gives a principal-agent model for government and sharing entities in data sharing system under asymmetrical information. It also analyzes the allocation of risks of both sides of the agency with the consideration of sharing subject＇s risk partiality, while giving the examples and discussion of this model. Throughthe design of the optimum incentive contract that government for sharing subject, this model can stimulate the sharing subject to do its best for data sharing and promote the effective operation of data sharing system.
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