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中文摘要：
近年来,食品安全问题频发,主要原因在于企业与消费者的信息不对称与双方追求自身利益。为了保障消费者利益并且将风险转移,我国建立食品安全责任保险制度。基于完全信息静态博弈理论,构建关于企业和保险公司的博弈模型,分析了纳什均衡,得到了我国食品保险推进过程中实现企业投保、保险公司承保有效合作的条件,并结合政府公共管理的职能,提出相应的对策建议。
英文摘要：
In recent years, food safety incidents have occurred frequently. The main reason lies in the information asymmetry and the pursuit of their own interests. In order to protect the interests of consumers and transfer risks, China has established the food safety insurance system. Based on complete information static game theory, build game model about firms and insurance companies and analyze the Nash Equilibrium to explore the cooperative conditions of the realization that food firms and insurance companies cooperate effectively in the process of advancing our country food safety. Combinated with government public management function, some corresponding suggestions are put forward.
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