在不完备市场中,交易并不会因为正式的产权保护和契约执行制度不存在或者不作为而停止,人们往往会自发地演化出一些替代性的市场治理结构来支撑市场交往、实现潜在的市场剩余。本文的目的在于使用比较制度实验的方法来研究各种替代性市场治理方式的特征和治理效率以及它们之间的交互作用,本研究对于发展中经济体和转型经济体中市场经济的发展和完善具有重要意义。
In incomplete markets, transactions do not stop because of the dys the formal contract enforcement system. Many alternative market governance structures spontaneously evolve out to govern contracting. This paper focuses on the characteristics and efficiency of these alternative governance mechanisms based on comparative institutional experiments.