基于董事会代理理论和资源依赖理论,利用2001—2005年我国上市公司的面板数据,从董事会的独立性、权益激励、薪酬激励和领导权激励四个方面出发,结合不同的所有权结构考察了我国上市公司董事会激励对公司价值的系统影响。实证结果表明,在我国上市公司中,董事会激励在一定程度上影响着董事会监督水平和资源提供能力的有效发挥,继而影响到公司价值的高低,而且我国特有的上市公司股权结构也造成了不同的董事会激励特征表现不尽相同,从而为有针对性地实施和加强董事会激励提供了有效的实证分析结果和建议。
Based on agency and resources dependence perspectives, using 2001 -2005 panel data of the listed firms, this paper studies the relationship between corporate value and director incentives from independence, stock stimulation, pay stimulation and leadership stimulation of the boards. The results show that director' s stimulation influence the effectiveness of monitoring and the provision of resources, then the corporate value. Furthermore, because of Chinese special shareholding structure, the indexes of director stimulation are more different, which gives effective empirical results and suggestions for implementing and strengthening stimulation of the board of directors.