位置:成果数据库 > 期刊 > 期刊详情页
两项业务流程外包中考虑流程模块化度的激励契约设计
  • ISSN号:1005-2542
  • 期刊名称:《系统管理学报》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F270[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]南开大学商学院,天津300007
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071080,70732004); 南开大学“985工程”哲学社会科学创新基地资助项目
中文摘要:

考虑业务流程模块化度等属性的影响有助于提高外包激励契约的有效性,促进外包成功。运用多任务委托-代理模型设计了考虑业务流程模块化度的影响的两流程外包激励契约模型。模型比较静态分析和数值分析的结果表明,随着任何一项流程模块化度的增大,在另一项流程上的激励强度系数都会增大。当服务商的一项流程技术水平足够高时,随着该项流程模块化度的增大,在该项流程上的激励强度系数将先增大后减小;否则,在该项流程上的激励强度系数将增大。任何一项流程的不确定性越高,则两项激励强度系数都会越低。随着服务商流程技术水平的提高,在该项流程上的激励强度系数将先增大后减小。流程模块化度对固定报酬的影响受到服务商的技术水平和风险规避度的干扰。发包商的期望利润分别是两项外包业务流程模块化度、服务商的技术水平和管理水平的递增函数,是服务商成本系数的递减函数。

英文摘要:

Considering the influence of business process modularity in the design of incentive contract may improve its viability thus facilitate BPO success. Using multi-task principal-agent model, we devise, under the situation of two business processes being outsourced to a vendor, the optimal incentive contract considering the influence of business process modularity. The comparative static analysis and numerical analysis show that, as one business process modularity gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on the other business process increases; when the level of the vendor's operational techniques on one business process is high enough, as the modularity of such business process gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process gets larger at first and then becomes smaller~ otherwise, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process increases. The uncertainty of the outcomes of each business process lowers both two incentive intensity coefficients. As the level of vendor's operational technique on one business process gets higher, the incentive intensity coefficient on such business process increases first and then decreases. The influence of business process modularity on the fixed reward is affected by the levels of vendor's operational techniques and risk aversion. The expected profit of client enterprise is an increasing function of business process modularity and the levels of vendor's operational techniques and managerial skill, and a decreasing function of vendor's cost coefficient.

同期刊论文项目
期刊论文 207 会议论文 22 著作 15
期刊论文 23 会议论文 3 著作 1
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
  • 《系统管理学报》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:国家教育部
  • 主办单位:上海交通大学
  • 主编:陈宏民
  • 地址:上海市华山路1954号
  • 邮编:200030
  • 邮箱:xtglxb@263.net
  • 电话:021-52301082
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1005-2542
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:31-1977/N
  • 邮发代号:4-743
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:4414