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中文摘要：
高管薪酬是企业对高管进行激励的常用手段,有效的薪酬契约能够激励高管努力工作,从而可以降低代理成本。然而在我国国有企业中,高管任免和薪酬确定受到有关政府部门的重要影响,甚至直接管理。我们认为,国有企业与政府之间的行政关系会影响国有企业,因此会导致国有企业和民营企业之间高管薪酬对于代理成本影响程度的不同。利用中央控股、地方控股和民营上市公司的数据,研究行政级别变量本身以及对于高管薪酬和代理成本之间关系的影响。研究发现,国有控股和民营上市公司内高管薪酬与代理成本之间的关系差异明显;在国有控股上市公司中,行政级别引致的行政激励对公司高管具有显著的激励作用,并且行政激励对薪酬激励具有一定的替代效应。
英文摘要：
Executive compensation is a common means of incentives.Effective compensation contracts can motivate executives to work hard and reduce agency costs.However,in the state-owned enterprises,the executive appointment,dismissal and remuneration determined influenced by the relevant government departments,even direct management.We confer that the administrative relationship between state-owned enterprises and the government will affect the state-owned enterprises,which lead to different influences about the relationship between executive compensation and agency costs in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.In this paper,we use the he data of central government holding,local government holding,and non-state-owned listed companies to study the relationship of administrative rank,executive compensation and agency costs.We find there is different relationship about executive compensation and agency costs between state-owned and private holding listed company.The administrative rank produce clear incentives to corporate executives and there is some substitution effect between administrative rank and compensation incentives.
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