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中文摘要：
通过运用传统的两阶段博弈模型对垄断厂商出租和出售耐用品进行对比分析可知，与出售相比，垄断厂商更加偏好出租。石磊-寇宗来模型也有一定不足，需着重分析加入道德风险、进入威胁和可置信承诺的条件后，耐用品垄断厂商出租和出售耐用品的最优选择问题。研究结果说明：首先，道德风险使垄断厂商在出租耐用品时承担额外的成本，在该成本大于临界道德风险成本时，垄断厂商将选择出售；反之亦然。其次，进入威胁会促使垄断厂商选择出售耐用品以占领部分市场，阻碍潜在竞争者进入。最后，垄断厂商做出不降价的可置信承诺能提高出售耐用品时的利润，加速资金流转。
英文摘要：
By using a two-stage game model,this paper analyses durable goods monopolist’s business strategy choice,and makes a reasonable explanation on the realistic question.It turns out that compared with sale,monopolist prefers to lease.But in reality,there are three factors against leasing.The first one is moral hazard,which makes monopolist bear the additional costs when leasing durable goods,and greatly reduces the enthusiasm of leasing.The second one is potential entrant that would lead to the choice to sell durable goods for monopolist,in order to capture the market share and to prevent potential competitors entering the market.The last one is credible commitment,if monopolist is able to make a credible commitment to resist cutting its prices,it can improve the profit of selling durable goods and accelerate cash flow.
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