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中文摘要：
正式和非正式控制机制能抑制机会主义已得到承认,但对它们的使用条件约束还少有研究.基于交易成本理论、社会交换理论和权变视角,探讨了正式控制（如契约）和非正式控制（如关系治理）对渠道中机会主义的单独以及联合作用在不同的关系内外部条件（关系持续时间和环境不确定性）下是否会发生变化.结果显示,长关系时间会削弱两种机制的作用,高环境不确定性抑制了契约的效果.关系时间短或环境不确定性低时,两种机制相互替代,而关系时间长或环境不确定性高时,二者相互加强.文章最后对研究的理论意义和管理启示进行了讨论.
英文摘要：
Researches on control mechanisms paid little attention to their dark side and conditional limits.Based on the transaction cost theory,social exchange theory and the contingency perspective,the paper explores the shifting effects of contracts,relational governance,as well as their interaction over the range of relationship duration and environmental uncertainty. The results reveal that both relationship duration and environmental uncertainty weaken the negative relationship between contracts and opportunism; relationship duration also weakens the negative relationship between relational governance and opportunism. Furthermore,contracts and relational governance function as substitutes at the early stage of channel relationships or in a relatively stable environment,yet they become complements in mature relationships or in highly uncertain environment.
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